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suppress heretical opinions in books and pamphlets and
to enlist the help of governments in doing so. This at-
tempt failed as the spread of heterodox opinions from
place to place and from country to country via the
printed word proved unstoppable. Moreover, secular
governments used the religious schism as an opportu-
nity to either subordinate the clergy or push them aside
altogether in order to exercise control over the printing
press. In his treatment of England, the author focuses
on the collapse of the Licensing Act at the end of the
seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century.
According to Tortarolo, this was the result not of a prin-
cipled rejection of censorship by Parliament, but rather
of a lack of consensus about how to carry on the tra-
ditional system of preventive censorship.
The author alludes to the growing importance of the
market in printed books in undermining censorship.
This deserved wider and deeper attention, particularly
in relation to the partial emergence in England in this
period of something like a civil society in which a partial
separation between religion and the state occurred,
while the market likewise assumed greater autonomy
and a discourse on individual human rights emerged.
Indeed, it is striking how in the throes of these devel-
opments contemporaries argued in principle for self-
regulation of speech by autonomous individuals or the
notion of judgment by public opinion in deciding what
should or should not be published or read.
Having dealt with England in one chapter, the author
devotes two more to the case of authors and censors in
France, a state in which the government continued to
exercise control over both religion and the market and
there was no breakthrough of civil society until 1789.
There were authors like Montesquieu, Helve´tius, and
Condorcet who bridled under the censorship and
looked to the freedom of England as their example. But
Tortarolo shows that in the face of the development of
the Enlightenment, many authors and censors were
complicit in the circulation of ideas—even subversive
ideas—as well as the maintenance of preventive cen-
sorship. It was always possible for authors to publish
abroad or clandestinely, but the official system offered
authors and printers the advantages of both legal and
commercial protection. Guillaume-Chre´tien de Lamoi-
gnon de Malesherbes, who virtually controlled the
French system of licensing in the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, himself spoke of censorship in France as one of
participatory liberty that permitted everything to be dis-
cussed except matters which directly threatened the
monarchy, religion, public order, and the honor of in-
dividuals. Malesherbes’s close associate Franc¸ois Ve´-
ron Duverger de Forbonnais insisted on the state’s need
to regulate the operation of the market, including the
market in books, in the name of the general interest. It
is important to note that the state of the market in
books and ideas in France and England is an important
clue to the state of the market overall in these countries
in the early modern period.
The author concludes his work by tracing the break-
down of the entente between the French regime and its
intellectuals on the eve of the Revolution. He then car-
ries us through a short overview of the rules of cen-
sorship in central and southern Europe in the eigh-
teenth century. There the system of censorship evolved
toward the French model, which above all involved the
elimination of clerical influence and the substitution of
censorship by the state.
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While David Wetzel’s Duel of Giants (2001) reexam-
ined the origins of the Franco-Prussian War, his sequel,
A Duel of Nations, analyzes the diplomacy and politics
of the war. This includes attempts by the French to
make other powers intervene on their side, Otto von
Bismarck’s attempts to foreclose outside interference
while defending German security interests, and at-
tempts to reestablish peace. Drawing from state ar-
chives and published documents in France, Germany,
Italy, and Austria, as well as contemporary autobiog-
raphies and recent studies on various aspects of the sub-
ject, Wetzel’s new study combines perceptive analysis
of mentalities, insightful interpretations of the main ac-
tors’ statecraft, and a profound understanding of how
the European international system operated in the age
of Bismarck.
Wetzel’s narrative is structured chronologically in
eight chapters. The first introduces the main actors on
the German side: Prussian Prime Minister Bismarck,
King William I, and General Helmuth von Moltke.
Here Wetzel ably reads and interprets the mind and
character of key actors. In the following chapters he
introduces actors of the French republican government
before analyzing Bismarck’s attempts to conclude
peace with a French provisional republican government
handicapped by a legitimacy deficit, a lack of authority,
and increasing internal dissensions. The French first
had to decide whether they would accept the conse-
quences of the folly of Emperor Napoleon III or deny
any responsibility and insist on a return to the status
quo. The republican government initially chose the lat-
ter course. Both Napoleon, unwilling to contemplate
surrender after the debacle at Sedan, and the Empress
Eugenie also refused to contemplate territorial conces-
sions at this stage. As Wetzel argues, the failure to come
to terms with sudden defeat prolonged a struggle that
Bismarck was ready to end had he received sufficient
guarantees for south German security. The continued
unwillingness of the French to accept defeat after the
fall of Metz played into the hands of Moltke, who was
bent to continue the war until France was crushed and
had lost its great power status. This Bismarck tried to
prevent, as such a destabilization of the European bal-
ance of power would almost certainly have triggered
foreign intervention.
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Although not uncritical of the results of the war, Wet-
zel demonstrates convincingly that Bismarck’s aim to
annex Alsace and parts of Lorraine was not precon-
ceived, but rather a result of his attention to south Ger-
man security fears raised by the French declaration of
war. By signaling his aim to secure Germany’s south-
western border, Bismarck shaped the expectations and
attitudes of the neutral powers, thus preventing those
leaders who considered joining France at the beginning
of the war from doing so. Bismarck’s restraint and
French military setbacks near Orleans and in Paris fi-
nally convinced Adolphe Thiers and Foreign Minister
Jules Favre to accept the conditions held out by the
German chancellor rather than continue a self-destruc-
tive war. Thus Bismarck prevailed in the internal strug-
gle against Moltke, and brought the war to an end once
the French government had accepted the annexations
upon which he thought German security depended.
Wetzel argues that “the victory over France in 1871
and the resulting terms of the [Peace] Treaty . . . gave
Germany more power than it needed” (p. 217), because
the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine and German
unification strengthened Europe’s central power. This
transferred the security dilemma to France. Had
France been able to keep Metz and an important por-
tion of French-speaking Lorraine, this gesture might
have made military parity easier to achieve, and might
have made it more difficult for French nationalists to
maintain their antagonistic attitude toward the German
Empire. However, the conquest of Metz and subse-
quent German victories had raised the price requested
by the military leadership, for whom the return of Metz
would have been an inexcusable betrayal by Bismarck,
with a view both to the lives sacrificed to conquer the
fortress, and to the fact that this was the territory
through which prior French rulers had invaded German
lands during the three preceding centuries.
Situating the Peace of Frankfurt in a larger historical
context, Wetzel argues that it provided an example of
Bismarck’s extraordinary statecraft, for his argument
for south German security was sufficiently convincing
to make the annexation of Alsace and the larger part of
Lorraine palatable to the diplomats of neutral powers.
Indeed, the newly elected French assembly accepted
the peace preliminaries immediately, by a huge major-
ity. France paid its indemnity within two years of the
war’s end, retained its colonies as well as sovereignty
over its military affairs, and incontestably remained a
great power. French postwar desire for “revenge” was
due more to the unwillingness to accept defeat than to
the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.
While the book does not explicitly situate the great
powers’ behavior within the nineteenth-century Con-
cert tradition of normative thinking and practices of
mediation, emphasizing instead the role of individuals,
it does make clear the probability of international me-
diation and integrates well the Black Sea Clauses Con-
ference. Still, there are a few blind spots. The diplo-
macy culminating in the unification of the south
German states with the North German Confederation
and the founding of the German Empire is practically
absent from the book, yet undoubtedly was part of the
diplomacy of the war. French and German diplomacy
vis-a`-vis neutral parties concerning the bombardment
of Paris, which increased the probability of interven-
tion, and the “humanitarian diplomacy” involving the
Red Cross may also deserve more attention in a com-
prehensive study on the diplomacy of the Franco-Prus-
sian War.
These minor reservations notwithstanding, the book
is a major achievement. It fills an important gap in the
literature, which has not seen such a lucid and well-
composed case study on nineteenth-century war and di-
plomacy in many years. The bibliographical essay at the
end adds to its value by orienting the serious researcher.
Brilliantly written, well-edited, balanced, and empa-
thetic in its interpretation of individuals and interna-
tional relations, the book should figure on any reading
list for advanced courses in nineteenth-century Euro-
pean or international history.
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At first glance, a book devoted to exploring the trans-
nationalism of tourism seems less than original. We al-
ready have many studies, to take just one example, of
European elites partaking in the Grand Tours of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of travelers leav-
ing home and crossing borders to explore “foreign
lands.” A transnational approach to tourism means
more than the movement of people, however, implying
a broader, multidirectional flow of information, orga-
nization, ideology, material items, and images across
borders. “Tourism was bigger than a series of discrete
national stories,” Eric G. E. Zuelow argues in the in-
troduction to this interesting edited collection; “it was
hardly ever entirely the domain of specific state actors
but was often the result of a larger current of devel-
opments.” (p. 7)
Part one of the book explores the role of the trans-
national in the creation and evolution of tourist spaces.
John K. Walton’s essay, “Seaside Resorts and Interna-
tional Tourism,” is a history of European seaside re-
sorts as spaces of “international” encounter and “cul-
tural mixing” (p. 20). Laurent Tissot explores the
transnational circulation of the alpine model, specifi-
cally the Swiss Alps. Angela Schwarz examines the im-
pact of international exhibitions and world’s fairs on the
development of mass tourism. Each of these interesting
contributions is largely summative, relying primarily,
and perhaps understandably, on secondary sources to
draw broad conclusions about exchange across multiple
countries and time periods. Stephen L. Harp’s thought-
ful case study of the role of other Europeans, especially
Germans, on the expansion of the French nudist resort
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